

## IT Security for the Radiation Oncology Physicist

Bruce Curran, MS, ME  
Associate Professor of Radiation Oncology  
Virginia Commonwealth University  
Richmond, VA

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

### Objectives

- ▶ Understanding how hospital IT requirements affect radiation oncology IT systems
- ▶ Illustrating sample practices for hardware, network, and software security
- ▶ Discussing implementation of good IT security practices in radiation oncology

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

### Some Observations

- ▶ The FDA classifies medical devices in classes, with regulations and safety requirements generally decreasing from Class 1 to Class 3.
- ▶ Most hospital IT departments do not understand that a radiation oncology EMR (e.g. Aria, Mosaik, Bogardus, ...) are FDA class 2 devices.
  - RO-EMRs also do treatment Management, and are classified as ancillary to linear accelerators
- ▶ Hospital EMRS (Cerner, Epic, ...) are all class 3
- ▶ Note: Recently the FDA has expanded the "ancillary" designation to include QA equipment in radiation oncology as well.

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## Medical Data Breaches

- ▶ While a stolen Social Security number might sell for 25 cents in the underground market, and a credit card number might fetch \$1, "A comprehensive **medical record** for me to get free surgery might be \$1,000," Halamka says. "It is a commodity that is hot on the black Internet [market]."
- <http://www.databreachtoday.com/hackers-are-targeting-health-data-a-7024>

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## What HIPAA (and/or IT) wants

- ▶ Detection of unauthorized access or attempted access.
- ▶ Unique, individual logins for all users
- ▶ Strong, unique passwords, changed on a regular basis
- ▶ Password-protected screen savers, with timeouts of 2 – 10 minutes
- ▶ PHI data cannot be easily removed
  - No local PHI storage on computers that might be stolen
  - Removable devices cannot be used to copy PHI data and remove illicitly.
- ▶ Foreign/unknown applications cannot be run on local workstations
- ▶ Regular updating of anti-virus software and security patches for safeguarding workstations.

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## Radiation Oncology Realities

- ▶ Many systems are based on generic passwords for multiple users.
  - Permission and access structures do not allow necessary access/sharing for multiple logins.
- ▶ Systems have different requirements and legal character sets, not always in sync with institution password requirements.
  - Often systems do not allow non-alphanumeric characters.
- ▶ Time required, e.g. setting up a patient, is incompatible with short unprotected access intervals to a workstation.
- ▶ Multiple users access the same workstation and applications; logout / login process loses data and inserts significant delays in the radiation oncology process.

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## Radiation Oncology Realities

- Service personnel use removable media to install service tools, copy logs, etc.
- CD or DVD image media are received for patients with off-site imaging for review
- Clinical trial requirements require digital transmission of patient data to central repositories.
- System incompatibilities require removable media to transfer information between systems / applications.

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## Resolving the Differences

- Intrusion detection / prevention
- Restricted logins / IP addresses
- Password managers
- Double-safe storage
- Network isolation / limited access
- Remote access software / VPNs
- Encryption

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## Intrusion Detection

An **Intrusion detection system (IDS)** is a device or [software application](#) that monitors network or system activities for malicious activities or policy violations and produces reports to a management station. IDS come in a variety of "flavors" and approach the goal of detecting suspicious traffic in different ways. There are network based (NIDS) and host based (HIDS) intrusion detection systems. Some systems may attempt to stop an intrusion attempt but this is neither required nor expected of a monitoring system. Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS) are primarily focused on identifying possible incidents, logging information about them, and reporting attempts. In addition, organizations use IDPSes for other purposes, such as identifying problems with security policies, documenting existing threats and deterring individuals from violating security policies. IDPSes have become a necessary addition to the security infrastructure of nearly every organization.<sup>[1]</sup> IDPSes typically record information related to observed events, notify security administrators of important observed events and produce reports. Many IDPSes can also respond to a detected threat by attempting to prevent it from succeeding. They use several response techniques, which involve the IDPS stopping the attack itself, changing the security environment (e.g. reconfiguring a firewall) or changing the attack's content.<sup>[2]</sup>

1. Scarfone, Karen; Mell, Peter (February 2007). "Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems (IDPS)". *Computer Security Resource Center* (National Institute of Standards and Technology) (800-94). Retrieved 1 January 2010

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion\\_detection\\_system](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion_detection_system)

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## Network Intrusion Detection Systems

- Network intrusion detection systems are placed at a strategic point or points within the network to monitor traffic to and from all devices on the network. It performs an analysis for a passing traffic on the entire subnet, works in a passive manner, thus does not match the traffic to the contents of the packets to the library of known attacks. Once the attack is identified, or abnormal behavior is sensed, the alert can be sent to the administrator. Example of the NIDS would be installing it on the subnet where firewalls are located in order to see if someone is trying to break into the firewall. Ideally one would scan all inbound and outbound traffic, however doing so might create a bottleneck that would impair the overall speed of the network.
- ### Host Intrusion Detection Systems
- Host intrusion detection systems run on individual hosts or devices on the network. A HIDS monitors system inbound and outbound packets from the device only and reports the activity to the administrator. If suspicious activity is detected, it takes a snapshot of existing system files and matches it to the previous snapshot. If the critical system files were modified or deleted, the alert is sent to the administrator to investigate. An example of a HIDS would be the use of the critical machine's logs, which are not expected to change their configurations.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion\\_detection\\_system](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrusion_detection_system)

**Intrusion prevention systems (IPS)**, also known as **Intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS)**, are **network security** appliances that monitor network and/or system activities for malicious activity. The main functions of intrusion prevention systems are to identify malicious activity, log information about this activity, attempt to block/stop it, and report it.<sup>[1]</sup>

Intrusion prevention systems are considered extensions of intrusion detection systems because they both monitor network traffic and/or system activity for malicious activity. The main differences are, unlike intrusion detection systems, intrusion prevention systems are placed in-line and are able to actively prevent/block intrusions that are detected.<sup>[25]</sup> More specifically, IPS can take such actions as sending an alarm, dropping the malicious packets, resetting the connection and blocking the traffic from the offending IP address.<sup>[26]</sup> An IPS can also correct cyclic redundancy check (CRC) errors, unfragmented data streams, prevent TCP session issues, and clean up unwanted transport and network layer options.<sup>[25]</sup>

1. ["NIST - Guide to Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems \(IDPS\)", February 2007. Retrieved 2010-06-25.](#)
2. [Jump up](#) to: Robert C. Newman (19 February 2009). *Computer Security: Protecting Digital Resources*. Jones & Bartlett Learning. p. 273. [ISBN 978-0-7637-4500-0](#). Retrieved 25 June 2010.
3. [Jump up](#) to: Michael E. Whitman; Herbert J. Mattord (2009). *Principles of Information Security*. Cengage Learning EMEA. pp. 289-. [ISBN 978-1-4239-0177-8](#). Retrieved 25 June 2010.
4. [Jump up](#) to: Tim Boyles (2010). *FCMA Security Study Guide, Exam 640-553*. John Wiley and Sons. p. 249-. [ISBN 978-0-470-52767-8](#). Retrieved 29 June 2010.
5. [Jump up](#) to: Harold F. Tipton; Micki Krause (2007). *Information Security Management Handbook*. CRC Press. [ISBN 978-1-4200-4120-0](#). Retrieved 29 June 2010.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligence\\_prevention\\_system](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intelligence_prevention_system)

SmartConnect Gateway HIT0002

Switch


Router

Hospital Network & Internet

Network supply, switch, router and installation not provided by Variant!


Variant Röhler Franz-Josef  
Wien, Austria (AT)  
Network Drawing

Specification 1: 10, 15, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100, 110, 120, 130, 140, 150, 160, 170, 180, 190, 200, 210, 220, 230, 240, 250, 260, 270, 280, 290, 300, 310, 320, 330, 340, 350, 360, 370, 380, 390, 400, 410, 420, 430, 440, 450, 460, 470, 480, 490, 500, 510, 520, 530, 540, 550, 560, 570, 580, 590, 600, 610, 620, 630, 640, 650, 660, 670, 680, 690, 700, 710, 720, 730, 740, 750, 760, 770, 780, 790, 800, 810, 820, 830, 840, 850, 860, 870, 880, 890, 900, 910, 920, 930, 940, 950, 960, 970, 980, 990, 1000, 1010, 1020, 1030, 1040, 1050, 1060, 1070, 1080, 1090, 1100, 1110, 1120, 1130, 1140, 1150, 1160, 1170, 1180, 1190, 1200, 1210, 1220, 1230, 1240, 1250, 1260, 1270, 1280, 1290, 1300, 1310, 1320, 1330, 1340, 1350, 1360, 1370, 1380, 1390, 1400, 1410, 1420, 1430, 1440, 1450, 1460, 1470, 1480, 1490, 1500, 1510, 1520, 1530, 1540, 1550, 1560, 1570, 1580, 1590, 1600, 1610, 1620, 1630, 1640, 1650, 1660, 1670, 1680, 1690, 1700, 1710, 1720, 1730, 1740, 1750, 1760, 1770, 1780, 1790, 1800, 1810, 1820, 1830, 1840, 1850, 1860, 1870, 1880, 1890, 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000, 2010, 2020, 2030, 2040, 2050, 2060, 2070, 2080, 2090, 2100, 2110, 2120, 2130, 2140, 2150, 2160, 2170, 2180, 2190, 2200, 2210, 2220, 2230, 2240, 2250, 2260, 2270, 2280, 2290, 2300, 2310, 2320, 2330, 2340, 2350, 2360, 2370, 2380, 2390, 2400, 2410, 2420, 2430, 2440, 2450, 2460, 2470, 2480, 2490, 2500, 2510, 2520, 2530, 2540, 2550, 2560, 2570, 2580, 2590, 2600, 2610, 2620, 2630, 2640, 2650, 2660, 2670, 2680, 2690, 2700, 2710, 2720, 2730, 2740, 2750, 2760, 2770, 2780, 2790, 2800, 2810, 2820, 2830, 2840, 2850, 2860, 2870, 2880, 2890, 2900, 2910, 2920, 2930, 2940, 2950, 2960, 2970, 2980, 2990, 3000, 3010, 3020, 3030, 3040, 3050, 3060, 3070, 3080, 3090, 3100, 3110, 3120, 3130, 3140, 3150, 3160, 3170, 3180, 3190, 3200, 3210, 3220, 3230, 3240, 3250, 3260, 3270, 3280, 3290, 3300, 3310, 3320, 3330, 3340, 3350, 3360, 3370, 3380, 3390, 3400, 3410, 3420, 3430, 3440, 3450, 3460, 3470, 3480, 3490, 3500, 3510, 3520, 3530, 3540, 3550, 3560, 3570, 3580, 3590, 3600, 3610, 3620, 3630, 3640, 3650, 3660, 3670, 3680, 3690, 3700, 3710, 3720, 3730, 3740, 3750, 3760, 3770, 3780, 3790, 3800, 3810, 3820, 3830, 3840, 3850, 3860, 3870, 3880, 3890, 3900, 3910, 3920, 3930, 3940, 3950, 3960, 3970, 3980, 3990, 4000, 4010, 4020, 4030, 4040, 4050, 4060, 4070, 4080, 4090, 4100, 4110, 4120, 4130, 4140, 4150, 4160, 4170, 4180, 4190, 4200, 4210, 4220, 4230, 4240, 4250, 4260, 4270, 4280, 4290, 4300, 4310, 4320, 4330, 4340, 4350, 4360, 4370, 4380, 4390, 4400, 4410, 4420, 4430, 4440, 4450, 4460, 4470, 4480, 4490, 4500, 4510, 4520, 4530, 4540, 4550, 4560, 4570, 4580, 4590, 4600, 4610, 4620, 4630, 4640, 4650, 4660, 4670, 4680, 4690, 4700, 4710, 4720, 4730, 4740, 4750, 4760, 4770, 4780, 4790, 4800, 4810, 4820, 4830, 4840, 4850, 4860, 4870, 4880, 4890, 4900, 4910, 4920, 4930, 4940, 4950, 4960, 4970, 4980, 4990, 5000, 5010, 5020, 5030, 5040, 5050, 5060, 5070, 5080, 5090, 5100, 5110, 5120, 5130, 5140, 5150, 5160, 5170, 5180, 5190, 5200, 5210, 5220, 5230, 5240, 5250, 5260, 5270, 5280, 5290, 5300, 5310, 5320, 5330, 5340, 5350, 5360, 5370, 5380, 5390, 5400, 5410, 5420, 5430, 5440, 5450, 5460, 5470, 5480, 5490, 5500, 5510, 5520, 5530, 5540, 5550, 5560, 5570, 5580, 5590, 5600, 5610, 5620, 5630, 5640, 5650, 5660, 5670, 5680, 5690, 5700, 5710, 5720, 5730, 5740, 5750, 5760, 5770, 5780, 5790, 5800, 5810, 5820, 5830, 5840, 5850, 5860, 5870, 5880, 5890, 5900, 5910, 5920, 5930, 5940, 5950, 5960, 5970, 5980, 5990, 6000, 6010, 6020, 6030, 6040, 6050, 6060, 6070, 6080, 6090, 6100, 6110, 6120, 6130, 6140, 6150, 6160, 6170, 6180, 6190, 6200, 6210, 6220, 6230, 6240, 6250, 6260, 6270, 6280, 6290, 6300, 6310, 6320, 6330, 6340, 6350, 6360, 6370, 6380, 6390, 6400, 6410, 6420, 6430, 6440, 6450, 6460, 6470, 6480, 6490, 6500, 6510, 6520, 6530, 6540, 6550, 6560, 6570, 6580, 6590, 6600, 6610, 6620, 6630, 6640, 6650, 6660, 6670, 6680, 6690, 6700, 6710, 6720, 6730, 6740,



## User Accounts / Passwords

- ▶ Manufacturers are working to restructure their software to allow independent logins.
- ▶ It is possible to restrict a user account for use on a limited set of workstation(s).
  - For example, a "non-user specific" login that can only be used at workstations for a specific treatment machine or TPS workstation
- ▶ IP addressing can be used to isolate specific workstations from general access, including limited internet access
  - Remove DNS resolution and define all needed IP addresses in host tables



## Password Guidelines

- ▶ Use a minimum password length of 12 to 14 characters if permitted.
- ▶ Include lowercase and uppercase alphabetic characters, numbers and symbols if permitted.
- ▶ Generate passwords randomly where feasible.
- ▶ Avoid using the same password twice (eg. across multiple user accounts and/or software systems).
- ▶ Avoid character repetition, keyboard patterns, dictionary words, letter or number sequences, usernames, relative or pet names, romantic links (current or past) and biographical information (e.g. ID numbers, ancestors' names or dates).
- ▶ Avoid using information that is or might become publicly associated with the user or the account.
- ▶ Avoid using information that the user's colleagues and/or acquaintances might know to be associated with the user.
- ▶ Do not use passwords which consist wholly of any simple combination of the aforementioned weak components.

[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password\\_strength](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Password_strength)

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## Passwords



Copyright © 2001 United Feature Syndicate, Inc.

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## Password Suggestions

- ▶ Password Generator Equation
  - Rather than maintaining a long list of passwords, develop an "equation" that can be used for all passwords. A combination of key words from the site, dates, a substitution cipher, etc. makes it easy to remember only the equation and be able to derive the password.
- ▶ Password Generator
  - If you use a single computer system, software such as **Keepass** can autogenerate a random password and auto-login; you don't even have to know the password.
  - For multiple systems (laptop, iPhone, iPad), there are applications (**Dashlane**) that work on all systems. However, these apps have limitations, such as not working with other apps on the device, that can limit their usefulness.

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---




---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---




---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## Current Practices

- ▶ Double-safe:
  - Similarly to NRC HDR regulations, most IT departments now require systems holding patient data to be behind two levels of security.
  - This is particularly true of patient databases, where large numbers of patients are stored in one system.
  - As a result, TPS storage is no longer allowed at the dosimetrist's desk; storage must be more secure.
  - Systems that have small amounts of patient data (local workstation cache, for example) are slowly being pushed to fully encrypted local storage.

---

---

---

---


---

---


---

---

## Remote Storage Architecture



## Encryption / Decryption



## Current Practices

- ▶ “Foreign” Computers
  - Many IT systems no longer allow non-registered computers to be connected (usually hard-wire) to hospital networks. In extreme cases, computers are tied to a single jack as well. This may prevent “roving” systems such as watertank computers from being able to plug in at each accelerator.
  - In at least one case, connection of a ‘foreign’ computer was grounds for immediate dismissal.



## Current Practices

### Removable Devices

- Non-encrypted (and possibly non-registered) USB devices are often not allowed to be mounted on computers within the IT network.
  - Some anti-virus+ software will check against hospital policy to only allow valid devices to be connected.
  - Cost of encrypted flash drives is much more than generic devices (~ \$160 for an 8GB flash drive)
- In some cases, USB ports are being locked up so that no devices can be plugged into them as well.

---

---

---

---


---

---

---

---

## USB Devices




---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## Device Control

Data Sheet

 **McAfee**  
An Intel Company

**McAfee Device Control**  
Prevent unauthorized use of removable storage devices on your network and endpoints

USB drives, MP3 players, CDs, DVDs, and other removable media, however useful, pose a real threat to your organization. Their small size and enormous storage capacity make it all too easy for confidential customer data and intellectual property to walk right out the front door and fall into the wrong hands—whether that's through loss or theft. How do you know who is storing what on which type of device? And even if the person or persons have permission to use the data, how can you be sure they are keeping it secure?

---

---

---



---

---

---

---

---



## Security Resources

**ELEKTA**

### MOSAIC System Requirements

#### Oncology Management System Requirements

**Notes:** This document outlines the system requirements for Elekta MOSAIC oncology management system. It is also applicable for Elekta MOSAIC oncology management system. The requirements are intended to ensure the system is installed and configured correctly. The requirements are intended to ensure the system is installed and configured correctly. The requirements are intended to ensure the system is installed and configured correctly.


**Overview**  
MOSAIC is designed for use on Windows-based computers in a LAN/WAN environment. The requirements are intended to ensure the system is installed and configured correctly. The requirements are intended to ensure the system is installed and configured correctly. The requirements are intended to ensure the system is installed and configured correctly.

**Version**  
This document covers system requirements for MOSAIC 1.1 through MOSAIC 2.0.

**Meaningful Use Act**  
MOSAIC version 2.0 satisfies the meaningful use certification. The certification does not apply to earlier versions of the software. Therefore, customers are advised to upgrade to MOSAIC version 2.0 or higher to ensure meaningful use.

MOSAIC  
CE0086

## Security Resources




---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## Security Resources



### Customer Technical Bulletin

CTB information		Approved Release Date: 11-1-10	
Title	Mission Critical Application Protection (MICAP) Whitepaper		
DWG Number	100051147	CTB	MI-781
Complaint No.	N/A	Est. Labor Hrs	N/A
Purpose	The MICAP Whitepaper clarifies the function, purpose, and intent of the MICAP configuration. For informational purposes only		
Product Code(s) Affected	N/A		
Prerequisites	N/A		
AN UPDATE TO THIS CTB MAY BE AVAILABLE ON MY.VARIAN.COM			

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## Security Resources



ARIA  
Security Implementation Guide

PN SG-SS-11-C February 2013

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

## ACR Bulletin – June, 2014



---

---

---

---

---


---

---

---

---

---



---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---

---